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L Introduction
More than eighty-five years ago the Supreme Court developed the doctrine
of Indian reserved water rights in Winters v. United States.' The Winters
Court held that the United States, in creating the Fort Belknap Indian
reservation, implicitly reserved river water flowing through and adjacent to the
reservation "for a use which would be necessarily continued through years."2
The Court further held that the reserved water was exempt from state prior
appropriation water laws?
The scope of the "Winters doctrine" was necessarily limited to surface
waters by the facts of the case. However, the Winters doctrine has been
expanded tremendously from a simple Indian water rights case to a complex
doctrine applicable to all federally reserved land.4 This comment addresses
one aspect of the doctrine: the treatment of groundwater in relation to the
Indian reserved water right?
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the issue of whether the
reserved water right of Indian reservations is applicable to groundwater. Legal
commentators disagree on the issue. A number of federal and state courts
recognize that Indian reserved water rights extend to groundwater. An equally
divided Supreme Court, however, affirmed without opinion a Wyoming
Supreme Court decision that held there was no intent by the United States to
reserve groundwater rights for the Wind River Indian Reservation.6 Congress,
1. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
2. Id. at 576-77.
3. Id.
4. A thorough explanation of the evolution is beyond the scope of this comment. For such
a description, see Harold A. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: Federal
Reservation of Rights to the Use of Water, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 639. Under the expanded
Winters doctrine it generally can be said that whenever the United States withdraws land from
the public domain, it implicitly reserves ground and surface waters to the extent necessary to
fulfill the purpose of the reservation. DAVID H. GErCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 311 (2d
ed. 1990); Robert J. Grow & Monte N. Stewart, The Winters Doctrine as Federal Common Law,
10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 457, 458 (1977).
5. This comment will not examine in detail Indian claims of aboriginal title to water. Some
tribes and law commentators have argued that Indian tribes have aboriginal water rights which
predate the rights of non-Indians. See, e.g., James L. Merrill, Aboriginal Water Rights, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 45 (1980); Rondolyn R. O'Brien, Indian Pueblo Water Rights Not Subject to State
Law Prior Appropriation, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 341, 342 (1977). A federal district court has
issued a stipulated decree that one tribal reservation has an immemorial priority date for certain
uses of the Gila River.* United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., Globe Equity Decree No. 59,
slip op. at 6, 86 (D. Ariz. June 29, 1935). However, not all reservation Indians can claim
aboriginal title to water since many tribes were uprooted and transplanted to reserved lands.
Furthermore, aboriginal water rights would protect water only as used by Indians since time
immemorial and would not protect recently developed water uses.
6. In re Big Hom River Sys., 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), affd mem. by an equally divided




by exercising its plenary power over Indians, has declared that water rights
disputes should be resolved through negotiated settlements rather than by
litigation. Congress has ratified numerous water settlement agreements
negotiated by state governments, federal-officials, and Indian tribes in pursuit
of this policy.
This examination of Indian reserved water rights as applied to groundwater
will begin with an explanation of precisely what groundwater is and why
groundwater increasingly raises important legal issues and problems. The
various water rights legal systems will then be described. A cursory overview
of both federal Indian policy and how the Indian reserved water right evolved
to its current state will follow. The main sections of this comment will
analyze how the Indian reserved groundwater rights question has been treated
through adjudications and negotiated settlements by the three branches of the
federal government, Indian tribes, and state governments. The examination
will conclude with comments on how current uncertainty regarding Indian
groundwater rights might encourage the policy of resolving Indian water rights
through negotiation instead of litigation.
I. The Nature of Groundwater
A. Groundwater Defined
Subsurface water is water existing "below the surface of the earth in the
interstices of soil and rocks," and groundwater is "that part of subsurface
water in interstices completely saturated with water."' Subsurface waters
collect in hydrological cycles when precipitation falls to earth in the form of
rain or snow or when fed by surface waters, such as rivers, lakes, and
wetlands.' An aquifer, which is essentially an underground reservoir of water,
is formed when permeable formations are saturated with water and contained
by impermeable formations.'
B. Types of Aquifers
Aquifers are classified as confined or unconfined.'" Confined aquifers
(also called artesian aquifers) sometimes naturally flow to the surface, such
as in the case of a spring, because they are under greater-than-atmospheric
7. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 230 (1973) (quoting
WILLIAM C. WALTON, GROUNDWATER RESOURCE EVALUATION (1970)).
8. CHARLES E. CORKER & DR. JAMES W. CROSBY III, GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION 48-51 (1971); see GETCHES, supra note 4, at 235-40; ZACHARY A. SMITH,
GROUNDWATER IN THE WEST 4 (1989); U.S. DEPT OF THE INTERIOR, GROUND WATER MANUAL
2 (2d ed. 1981). Subsurface water is sometimes called percolating groundwater because it filters
through the earth into interstices of soil and rock. See SMITH, supra, at 4.
9. GETCHES, supra note 4, at 238.
10. CORKER, supra note 8, at 68-75; see GETcHES, supra note 4, at 238-39; SMITH, supra
note 8, at 5.
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pressure." The greater-than-atmospheric pressure is generated when
overlying and underlying impermeable strata compress the aquifer."
'Most aquifers are unconfined, existing under normal atmospheric
pressure. 3 Unconfined aquifers must be pumped to withdraw the
groundwater."'
The rate of displaced groundwater being replaced by the hydrological cycle
varies greatly according to permeability of the formation and geological
conditions. 5 Some aquifers are functionally nonrecharging because it takes
decades or centuries for pumped groundwater to be replaced. 6 For example,
many groundwater aquifers in New Mexico are functionally nonrecharging,
and they are administered with the understanding that they will be depleted
in he future.'
Aquifers undergo depletion, also referred to as overdrafts or mining, when
groundwater is withdrawn at a rate greater than its rate of recharging. 8 The
"saFe yield" of an aquifer is the amount of groundwater an aquifer will yield
without overdraft. 9 For example, many groundwater aquifers in North
Dakota recharge regularly, allowing those groundwater systems to be managed
on a "safe yield" basis.'
C. Inadequate Geohydrologic Data
One problem in administering groundwater rights is the problem of locating
and accurately quantifying aquifers. The Supreme Court of Ohio aptly stated
the problem in 1861:
mhe existence, origin, movement and course of [groundwaters],
and the causes which govern and direct their movements, are so
secret, occult and concealed, that an attempt to administer any set
11. CORKER, supra note 8, at 68-75.
12. Id. at 68-72.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 69.
15. Id. at 72-75.
16. Charles J. Meyers, Federal Groundwater Rights: A Note on Cappaert v. United States,
13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 377, 382 (1978).
17. SMITH, supra note 8, at 10. Dean Meyers cites the Ogallala aquifer as "a well-known
example of a functionally non-recharging aquifer." Meyers, supra note 16, at 382. The Ogallala
aquifer covers an area of 225,000 miles, underlying portions of New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma,
Kan;sas, Colorado, Nebraska, Wyoming, and South Dakota. SMITH, supra note 8, at 14-15. The
impact of overdrafts varies significantly region to region. Id.; see also Steve Frazier & Brenton
R. Schlender, Huge Area in Midwest Relying on Irrigation Is Depleting Its Water, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 6 (reporting that water is being withdrawn from some parts of the
Ogallala aquifer at 15 to 18 times faster than it can be recharged).
18. CORKER, supra note 8, at 75-78, 96-97; GErCHEs, supra note 4, at 239; SMrriH, supra
note 8, at 5.
19. CORKER, supra note 8, at 75-78, 96-97; GErcHES, supra note 4, at 239.




of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless
uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible.2
Geohydrology has made tremendous strides in measuring and tracking
groundwater since 1861, but it remains a significant problem.' For example,
hydrologists such as Corker and Crosby have noted at least five variables in
measuring an aquifer: (1) total quantity of water in the aquifer; (2) the rate
of recharge; (3) the changing quality of the available groundwater; (4) the
effect of withdrawals on groundwater levels and withdrawal capabilities; and
(5) the effect of groundwater withdrawal on surface water supplies.'
It is an arduous and expensive task for courts and water supply
administrators to obtain the necessary geohydrologic data to make informed
decisions about the supply and movement of groundwater." For instance,
one major obstacle is detecting and proving overdrafts. The inadequacy of
data becomes critical when a party has to shoulder the burden of proof to
assert a groundwater right in litigation.'
D. Hydrologically Connected Ground and Surface Waters
As noted previously, groundwater and surface waters frequently interrelate:
Groundwaters can feed surface streams, while surface waters can connect to
and charge aquifers.' This becomes a cause for concern when groundwater
users tap into an aquifer that supplies connected surface waters because the
depletion of the aquifer could reduce the flow of the surface water.'
Hydrologists and water law commentators advocate managing hydrologically
connected ground and surface waters as a single, integrated system since the
connected waters actually constitute one water supply.'
Initially, some hydrologists theorized that groundwater was separate and
unrelated to surface waters." Based on this inaccuracy, many states created
separate legal systems for groundwater and surface waters." Uncertainty and
confusion resulted when state economies "developed in reliance on two
21. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861).
22. CORKER, supra note 8, at 80-81; Douglas L. Grant, The Complexities of Managing
Hydrologically Connected Surface Water and Groundwater Under the Appropriation Doctrine,
22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 63, 89-90 (1987).
23. CORKER, supra note 8, at 53.
24. Grant, supra note 22, at 89-90.
25. Id.
26. CORKER, supra note 8, at 56-58; NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 233;
Grant, supra note 22, at 63-64. It is notable, however, that most aquifers and surface waters in
Arizona are not hydrologically connected. Id. at 63 n.2.
27. CORKER, supra note 8, at 53.
28. Grant, supra note 22, at 64.
29. NATIONAL WATER COMMN, supra note 7, at 233.
30. Id.
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different legal systems for one interrelated supply" of water.3 Arid western
states, such as Colorado and New Mexico, had great difficulty in converting
from bifurcated to integrated surface water and groundwater legal systems.32
Recognizing the "need for integration" of water law systems, the National
Water Commission recommended:
Recommendation No 7-1: State laws should recognize and take
account of the substantial interrelation of surface water and
ground water. Rights in both sources of supply should be
integrated, and uses should be administered and managed
conjunctively. There should not be separate codifications of
surface water law and ground water law; the law of waters should
be a single, integrated body of jurisprudence.3
Hence, a prudent interpretation of the Indian reserved water right would apply
the doctrine uniformly to ground and surface waters. A few states, however,
such as Arizona, continue to have bifurcated legal systems for ground and
suiface waters.
E. The Importance of Groundwater
Groundwater has become a vital natural resource for the United States,
especially for ard western states. It has been estimated that groundwater
constitutes more than 90% of the fresh water supply in the United States.'
Groundwater use more than quadrupled from 21 billion to 88 billion
gallons a day from 1945 to 1980."5 Groundwater is relied upon nationally for
35% of the public water system supply; 80% of the water consumed for rural
domestic and livestock purposes; 40% of the irrigated agriculture water; and
6% of the self-supplied industrial water.' Groundwater comprises 38% of
the total water used in the nineteen western states,3" of which: 8% is used
in public water systems; 2% for rural domestic and livestock purposes; 82%




34. SMITH, supra note 8, at 4, 18 n.l.
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id.
37. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 4. The percentages of groundwater to total water supply vary significantly state
to state. It is 57% in Texas, 52% in Arizona, 48% in California and South Dakota; 46% in New
Mexico, 35% in Idaho, 17.5% in Colorado, 10% in Wyoming, 9.3% in Utah, 9.2% in North
Dakota, and only 2.3% in Montana Id. at 5 (reprinting data compiled from U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, WATER SUPPLY PAPER 2250 - NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY (1983)).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss2/4
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Groundwater has always been important to the settlement of the West.
Early western settlers relied on windmill pumps to provide enough water for
domestic use. 9 Technological advances in the centrifugal pump and
irrigation systems dramatically increased the reliance of western state
economies on groundwater for mineral mining and irrigated agriculture."
The demands of growing populations will only increase the importance of
groundwater in western state economies.
III. Water Rights Legal Systems
States have adopted different approaches to assigning water rights. These
differing approaches become very confusing in states that bifurcate ground
and surface water in their legal systems. Three major water rights legal
doctrines have developed in Anglo-American jurisprudence: riparian, prior
appropriation, and correlative rights.
A. Riparian Doctrine
The common law rule, as it developed in England, is the doctrine of
absolute ownership of water rights' Under this doctrine, water rights run
with the land. The owner of land has property rights to the water under the
land and, absent malice, the water may be withdrawn without regard to the
effect it has on other landowners.43 American courts, particularly those in
water-rich eastern states, widely adopted the riparian rights doctrine, but they
modified it to enlarge the use restriction from malice to unreasonable use."
Thus, under the American riparian doctrine, water rights are part of the real
property right with the restriction that the landowner has the right of
reasonable use under the circumstances of supply and demand.
B. Prior Appropriation Doctrine
The prior appropriation doctrine was developed by western states, where
water is a scarce and unreliable resource.!5 The premise is simple: "First in
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id.; see also John H. Davidson, South Dakota Groundwater Protection Law, 40 S.D. L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (1995) (discussing other aspects of the importance of groundwater).
41. CORKER, supra note 8, at 98-102. Hawaii and Louisiana have distinct hybrid systems.
Hawaii's is based on aboriginal law and recent statutes. Louisiana adapted its water law system
from the French Civil Code. GErcHEs, supra note 4, at 207-13.
42. CORKER, supra note 8. at 98-102; GETCHES, supra note 4, at 246-47.
43. CORKER, supra note 8, at 102-04; GErcHES, supra note 4, at 246; SMITH, supra note 8,
at 8.
44. CORKER, supra note 8. at 102-04; GEcTcHEs, supra note 4, at 246; SMrTH, supra note 8,
at 8.
45. G-rCHES, supra note 4, at 5-6. The prior-appropriation doctrine apparently was first
enunciated by the Colorado Supreme Court in Coffin v. The Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443
(1882). Hence, it is frequently referred to as the "Colorado Doctrine." FRANK J. TRELEASE,
No. 2]
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time, first in right."' The doctrine severs the water right from running with
the land. The one who puts water to a beneficial use, whether or not he or
sh,.. owns the connected land, has a right that is superior to that of later users
from the same water source.47 The prior appropriation doctrine developed as
a practical and efficient means of dealing with a scarce and vital natural
resource. Additionally, the doctrine encouraged economic development in the
West since users risked the loss of their water rights if they failed to exercise
them.
The prior appropriation doctrine developed in response to surface water
conflicts and, in those states with unified systems, the doctrine carried over
basically unchanged to groundwater. One recent development, however, is
that many states regulate groundwater use and attempt to protect prior
appropriations through groundwater use permits." Many western states have
statutes setting reasonable pumping levels for all or parts of a state'
States with bifurcated groundwater and surface water legal systems
sometimes apply different water rights doctrines to groundwater and surface
water. Arizona, for example, applies riparian rights to groundwater and the
prior appropriation doctrine to surface water.
C. Correlative Rights Doctrine
The correlative rights doctrine is a hybrid system of riparianism and prior
appropriation that was developed initially by the California courts. States
following the correlative rights doctrine usually have complex rules applying
a combination of the riparian and prior appropriation doctrines to a variety of
situations.' An application of the "California doctrine" is found in the well-
known case of Lux v. Haggin.5 In Lux, the California Supreme Court held
that a person acquiring federal lands received riparian rights by virtue of his
foderal fee-patent but these rights were subject to prior appropriations existing
on the public land or permitted by special legislation.'
The correlative rights doctrine, as generally applied to groundwater,
preserves the landowner's right to use the water under his or her property but
provides that landowners sharing a common source of groundwater have equal
rights to a reasonable amount of water. 3 The correlative rights doctrine in
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 26 (1971).
46. GETCHES, supra note 4, at 6.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 249-51; SMiTH, supra note 8, at 9-10.
49. GETCHES, supra note 4, at 249-51; SMITH, supra note 8, at 9-10. States with pumping-
level statutes are Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon,
Scuth Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. GETCHES, supra note 4, at 251.
50. GTCHES, supra note 4, at 6-7; TRELEASE, supra note 45, at 25-26.
51. 10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
52. Id. at 775, 783.




California applies riparian rights to overlying landowners and includes
appropriation of any surplus on a first-to-use basis.'
IV. The Indian Reserved Water Rights Doctrine
A. Federal Authority Over Indians and Federal Indian Policies
A good summary of federal authority over Indians and Indian policy is
found in Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law:
The federal-tribal relationship is premised upon broad but not
unlimited federal constitutional power over Indian affairs, often
described as "plenary." The relationship is also distinguished by
special trust obligations requiring the United States to adhere
strictly to fiduciary standards in its dealings with Indians. The
inherent tension between broad federal authority and special
federal trust obligations has produced a unique body of law.5
Congressional plenary power stems from the Commerce Clause, which grants
Congress power "[t]o regulate Commerce ... with the Indian Tribes."'
The history of United States national policy toward Indians is marked by
erratic pendular swings from one polar extreme to the other. The national
policy positions can be categorized into distinct time periods.' The
"formative years" encompass 1789 to 1871." Initially, European-American
settlers treated Indian tribes as quasi-independent nations that could be
placated through treaties. It was through these treaties that many of the
current reservations were created. As the United States consolidated control
over its territory and the expansion to the West and South became national
policy, Congress adopted a policy of abandoning formal treaty making.'
Federal policy dramatically shifted to "allotment and assimilation" during
the years 1871 to 1928.6 Under this policy, Indian "civilization" and
assimilation into American society was the goal. The Allotment Acte was
the primary means of accomplishing this policy by encouraging the
54. TRELEASE, supra note 45, at 37-38.
55. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 207 (Rennard Strickland et al.
eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN].
56. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
57. WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTsHELL 9-31 (2d ed. 1988);
COHEN, supra note 55, at 47-206.
58. COHEN, supra note 55, at 62.
59. Id. at 105.
60. Id. at 105-06.
61. Id. at 127-32.
62. Ch. 119,24 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339,341,342,348,
349, 354, 381 (1988)).
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government to allot Indian reservation lands to individual Indians, who could
later convey the land to non-Indians.'
Policy shifted sharply to the opposite pole in the "Indian reorganization"
era from 1928 to 1942.' Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934 to effectuate the government's new policy of halting allotment and
protecting the land base of the tribes.' During this period tribes were
encouraged to adopt constitutions.' Felix Cohen's original Handbook of
Federal Indian Law was published in 1942, near the end of this era.'
From 1943 to 1961 federal policy swung back to the other pole to what
was proclaimed the "termination" era." Congressional criticism of Indian
reorganization culminated in 1953 with the adoption of a federal policy of
rapid and coercive "termination."' The goal of the termination policy was
to destroy the communal lifestyle and sovereignty of certain enumerated tribes
and to bring Indians under the jurisdiction of the states as assimilated, self-
sufficient individuals.70 Indian lands were allowed to pass to non-Indians,
tribal economic development was ignored, and Indian relocation into urban
areas was encouraged.7!'
The present era began in 1961 with the current federal policy of "self-
determination" for Indian tribes.' Congress unofficially abandoned the
termination policy in 1958, and during the 1960 presidential election the
platforms of both Richard Nixon and John Kennedy supported changing
federal Indian policy.' President Nixon set forth the current federal policy
in 1970, declaring termination to have been a failure and urging Congress to
adopt a new policy of tribal autonomy combined with the federal trust
63. COHEN, supra note 55, at 130-31. The allotment policy had the effect of "checker-
boarding" Indian reservations with Indian and non-Indian-held land. Non-Indian-held land within
Indian reservation boundaries has complicated jurisdictional lines between tribal, state, and federal
courts.
64. Id. at 144-52.
65. Id. at 147-51.
66. Id. at 149.
67. FELix S. CoHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw (Five Rings 1986) (reprint of
Univ. of N.M. photo. reprint 1971) (1942). Three editions of the Handbook have been published.
The first edition, which promoted tribal sovereignty, was the first synthesis of Indian case law
and became the authoritative treatise on Indian law. In a blatant attempt at revisionist history, the
Department of Interior "updated" the Handbook with its 1958 edition. The 1958 edition was
generally shunned by the legal community. The 1982 edition, published under the guidance of
a board of prominent Indian law scholars, updated Cohen's original work within his original
philosophy of advancing tribal sovereignty. COHEN, supra note 55, at vii-xi. The 1982 edition
ha; restored the Handbook to its original position of being the authoritative treatise on Indian law.
68. COHEN, supra note 55, at 152-80.
69. Id. at 152-53; see H.R. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
70. COHEN, supra note 55, at 152-58.
71. Id. at 152-53.
72. Id. at 180-206.




relationship.' The self-determination policy is based on Indian tribes acting
as the basic governing body for Indians, with the federal government
performing a strong trustee role." A congressional commission, the
American Indian Policy Review Commission, was established in 1975 "to
conduct a comprehensive review of the historical and legal developments
underlying the Indians' unique relationship with the Federal Government in
order to determine the nature and scope of necessary revisions in the
formulation of policies and programs for the benefit of Indians." 6 Among
other things, the Commission's 1977 report called for a repudiation of
assimilationist policies and recognition of tribes as permanent, self-governing
entities." Subsequent to the commission's report, congressional and executive
policies have favored tribal self-government.' Congress has failed, however,
to repeal many laws enacted in the allotment and termination eras, which has
led to judicial decisions contrary to current federal policy.'
In the turmoil of these dramatic executive branch and legislative policy
shifts, the special trust relationship of the federal government toward Indians
was judicially evolving.' The trust relationship took root8 ' when Chief
Justice John Marshall characterized Indian tribes as domestic dependent
nations with a right to occupy reserved land until the United States
extinguished title.' In a later decision, Marshall elaborated that "[Indians]
74. H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
75. COHEN, supra note 55, at 185-88.
76. S.J. Res. 133, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Pub. L. No. 93-580, 88 Stat. 1910 (1975).
77. 1 AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REvIEW COMM'N, 95TH CONG., 2D SEsS., FINAL REPORT
ch. 5 (Comm. Print 1977).
78. CANBY, supra note 57, at 31.
79. See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 112 S. Ct. 683 (1992) (based on a 1906 amendment to the Allotment Act).
80. COHEN, supra note 55, at 220.
81. CANBY, supra note.57, at 34-35.
82. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 586-88 (1823). In Johnson v. M'Intosh,
Chief Justice Marshall attempted to rationalize the European "discovery" and "conquest" of
America. He reasoned:
mhe tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To
leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness;
to govern them as a distinct people, was impossible, because they were as brave
and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every
attempt on their independence.
Id. at 590. Chief Justice Marshall apparently changed his view of Indian rights when he wrote
the Worcester v. Georgia decision in 1832:
America ... was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations,
independent of each other and the rest of the world, having institutions of their
own, and governing themselves by their own laws. It is difficult to comprehend
the proposition, that the inhabitants of either quarter of the globe could have
rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over the
lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other should give the
No. 2]
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are in a state of pupilage .... Their relation to the United States resembles
that of a ward to his guardian."' The President and Congress adopted the
special federal trust relationship to Indians as official policy during the self-
determination era.
The Supreme Court recognizes, under the trust doctrine, that Congress has
broad leeway in exercising its plenary power:
In Morton v. Mancari the Supreme Court stated: "As long as the
special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of
Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians, such legislative
judgments will not be disturbed."
Although the Court has never spoken directly to the issue, the
requirement of a rational tie between an Indian statute and the
fulfillment of the trust relationship seems to impose substantive
limitations on Congress. This standard, in practice, does not allow
a reviewing court to second guess a particular determination by
Congress that a statute is an appropriate protection of the Indians'
interests.'
But the Supreme Court liberally construes statutes, treaties, agreements, and
executive orders as creating Indian rights. ' Furthermore, once Indian rights
are shown to exist, the Supreme Court requires a "clear and plain" expression
of congressional intent to abrogate them. ' For example, in a treaty
establishing an Indian reservation the Court will construe congressional silence
on water rights as creating, by implication, Indian rights to water. Once
established, the right can only be taken away by a "clear and plain" statement
of Congress to that effect.
The federal government, however, has a long history of being grossly
remiss in securing, protecting, and developing adequate water supplies for
Indian reiervations. As stated in Cohen:
discoverer rights in the country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing rights
of its ancient possessors.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 542-43 (1832) (holding that a state law regulating the
Cherokee territory was superseded by United States laws and treaties designed to protect the right
of self-government by Indian tribes); see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1
(1331) (holding that Indian tribes are not "foreign states" within the meaning of Article III of the
Constitution). One could speculate that Chief Justice Marshall's changed perspective was a result
of the lapse in time. Perhaps it may have been because the case of Johnson v. M'Intosh only
indirectly concerned Indians, whereas Cherokee Nation and Worcester directly involved the rights
of Indian tribes and individuals.
83. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
84. COHEN, supra note 55, at 221 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974)),





[T]he government's failure to assert, protect, and develop Indian
water rights can be traced to its conflicts of interest. The United
States Congress and the Interior and Justice Departments have
responsibility to advance, at the same time, the national interest
in land and water use as well as the interests of Indians for whom
the government acts as trustee. Disputes often arise between the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and other agencies within the
Department of Interior. An Indian tribe might claim water rights
which are needed for a reclamation project or other federal uses.
When the competing claims are resolved within the Department,
too often the result is that Indian claims tend to be compromised
or defeated.'
Some tribes have instituted lawsuits against the United States, claiming
breach of fiduciary duty in fulfilling its trust obligations toward the Indians.'
In Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States,' the Gila
River tribes claimed the United States breached its fiduciary duty by
permitting groundwater mining adjacent to the reservation. The court noted
that in settling the water rights claims of the Ak-Chin Indian community,
Congress admitted that "it is likely that the United States would be held liable
for its failure to provide water and for allowing ground water beneath the
reservation to be mined."" Then, the court stated:
Ground water under the Gila River reservation impliedly was
reserved for the Indians. The special relationship that triggers the
fair and honorable dealings standard obligates the United States
to protect the ground water to the extent that it is needed as a
supplement to surface water supplies to maintain a self-sufficient
status from irrigated agriculture. This special relationship,
however, did not create a right in plaintiffs to have the United
States obligated to protect and preserve for them all of the ground
water under the reservation .... Plaintiffs' right to protection of
ground water resources extended only to ground water that could
have been put to beneficial use. Defendant would have liability
only on a showing that the Pima Agency's actions denied
87. COHEN, supra note 55, at 597; see NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 474-75.
88. PETER W. SLY, RESERVED WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT MANUAL 90 (1988); see, e.g.,
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1988) (dismissing without
prejudice, because the tribe had not exhausted administrative remedies, tribal claims that the
Department of the Interior fraudulently mismanaged the tribe's grazing land and timber in order
to divert Salt River water from the reservation to non-Indian water users).
89. 9 Cl. Ct. 660 (1986), affd, 877 F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
90. Id. at 699 (quoting Water Rights Claims - Ak-Chin Indian Community, Pub. L. No.
95-328, 92 Stat. 409 (1978)).
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plaintiffs' water for irrigation that otherwise could have been put
to beneficial use'
The court held the Gila River tribes failed to meet their burden of proof; to
date, no tribe has successfully asserted a groundwater claim against the United
States under this trust relationship standard.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Indian Treaties and Agreements
Treaties and agreements creating Indian reservations were drafted by the
United States and agreed to by Indians who usually neither spoke nor read
English. The Supreme Court has been suspect of the fairness of these treaties
and agreements given the circumstances under which they were negotiated.
Central to the Supreme Court's federal trust doctrine are special canons of
construction that the Court developed for interpreting treaties and agreements
between Indians and the United States government.' Three primary canons
of construction have been developed: (1) interpreting the agreement or treaty
as the Indians themselves would have understood it; (2) resolving
ambiguities in the documents in favor of the Indians;" and (3) liberally
construing the treaties or agreements in favor of the Indians." Additionally,
the Supreme Court has ruled that Congress must show a "clear and plain"
intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights.'
C. Federal Conflict with State Prior Appropriation Laws
The Winters doctrine resulted from a conflict over the application of state
prior appropriation laws to federally held lands. Prior to the Winters decision
Congress recognized the validity of several states' prior appropriation doctrine,
and it had adopted a policy of deferring to local water laws." In conflict
with this policy was congressional reservation of lands for Indians by way of
agreements and treaties: Would non-Indians, who were usually more economi-
cally developed than the Indians, be permitted to appropriate unused water
adjacent to Indian reservations?
As noted in the introduction, the Winters doctrine established that Congress
must have implicitly intended to reserve water rights in connection with lands
set aside for Indian reservations. Winters v. United States involved a conflict
91. Id. at 699-700.
92. COHEN, supra note 55, at 221.
93. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 582 (1832).
94. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1899); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S.
1, 27 (1886).
95. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
96. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
97. COHEN, supra note 55, at 577; GETCHES, supra note 4, at 194-97; see, e.g., Act of July
26, 1866, ch. 262, § 9, 14 Stat. 251, 253 (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 51 (1988)), amended by Act
of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, § 17, 16 Stat. 217, 218 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1988)); Desert




of water rights between reservation Indians and non-Indians who owned lands
ceded by the Indians to the federal government." The non-Indians had made
a substantial economic investment in diverting Milk River water for irrigated
agriculture, thereby depriving the downstream Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation of most of the Milk River water. The non-Indians claimed that
the reservation was entitled to only 250 inches of water, since that was the
amount of the Milk River water used by the reservation prior to the irrigation
project.
The Supreme Court stated, "The case, as we view it, turns on the
agreement of May, 1888, resulting in the creation of the Fort Belknap
Reservation."' The agreement'" was silent on the issue of water rights, so
the Court turned to the canons of construction. The Court concluded that in
making the agreement the Indians would have realized the need for water and
would have reserved the use of the Milk River."' Thus, reserved water on
Indian reservations were exempted from the prior appropriation laws of the
states.'12
The Court rationalized its decision by noting that the purpose of creating
the reservations was to transform the Indian peoples from nomadic hunters
and gatherers to a pastoral people." Thus, the Court stated,
[I]t would be extreme to believe that within a year Congress
destroyed the reservation and took from the Indians the
consideration of their grant, leaving them a barren waste - took
from them the means of continuing their old habits, yet did not
leave them the power to change to new ones."
The Winters doctrine as it applies to Indian reservations has been
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions." The Winters
doctrine, however, has an uncertain future as evidenced during oral arguments
in the Big Horn case, when Supreme Court members questioned the continued
validity of the reserved water rights doctrine.'"
98. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
99. Id. at 575.
100. Agreement with the Indians of Gros Ventre, Piegan, Blood, Blackfeet, and River Crow
Tribes Establishing a Reservation, Montana, May 1, 1888, ch. 213, 25 Stat. 113 (1887-1889).
101. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 577.
105. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963), decree entered, 376 U.S. 340
(1964).
106. Walter Rusinek, A Preview of Coming Attractions? Wyoming v. United States and the
Reserved Rights Doctrine, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 355, 403-05 (1990). Rusinek analyzed the oral
argument transcripts and interviewed reporters who attended the Supreme Court oral arguments
in Wyoming v. United States.
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In Winters, the Supreme Court was very ambiguous in defining the scope
of the reserved water right, using the phrase "for a use which would be
necessarily continued through years."'" The open-ended reserved water right
created by Winters undermined the prior appropriation doctrine by destroying
the certainty that the doctrine brought to water rights in the West. For
example, how could a non-Indian community or company invest in a project
if it had no future guarantee of having the amount of water secured under the
prior appropriation doctrine? The conflict is fundamental.
The Winters doctrine was slow to develop, due in part to the federal
government's failure in its duty to protect the Indian water rights interest10 8
FCr example, the Department of Interior, which includes the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, was given a conflicting duty under the Reclamation Act of 1902 "to
locate, construct, operate and maintain works for the storage, diversion, and
development of waters for the reclamation of ard and semi-arid land in the
West.'"" In its report, the National Water Commission stated:
Following Winters, more than 50 years elapsed before the
Supreme Court again discussed significant aspects of Indian water
rights. During most of this 50-year period, the United States was
pursuing a policy of encouraging the settlement of the West and
the creation of family-sized farms on its arid lands. In retrospect,
it can be seen that this policy was pursued with little or no regard
for Indian water rights and the Winters doctrine. With the
encouragement, or at least the cooperation, of the Secretary of the
Interior - the very office entrusted with protection of all Indian
rights - many large irrigation projects were constructed on
streams that flowed through or bordered Indian Reservations,
sometimes above and more often below the Reservations. With
few exceptions the projects were planned and built by the Federal
Government without any attempt to define, let alone protect, prior
rights that Indian tribes might have had in the waters used for the
projects."0
A series of cases in the Ninth Circuit did address some of the issues
implicated by the Winters doctrine."' Finally, in Arizona v. California,"'
107. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
108. COHEN, supra note 55, at 596-97; NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., LEGAL
ISSUES IN INDIAN JURISDICnON 33 (1976); NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 474-75.
109. NATIONAL Ass'N OF ATrORNEYS GEN., supra note 108, at 33.
110. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra note 7, at 474-75. In regard to the 50-year lapse in
Supreme Court cases interpreting Winters, the Commission did footnote an exception in United
States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939), which extended the Winters doctrine to allotted lands sold
to non-Indians.
111. See United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956), cert,
denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957) (upholding a 1908 agreement between the Secretary of the Interior
[Vol. 19
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the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Winters doctrine and attempted to clarify
the quantification issue. Arizona originated from disputed water right claims
to the Colorado River waters and its tributaries by the states of Arizona and
California."' Later, the United States asserted claims to the disputed water
for the use of federally held lands, including five Indian reservations in
Arizona, California, and Nevada."4 In Arizona, the special master, who was
appointed by the district court to conduct a lengthy trial and report on his
findings, quantified the Indian reservation water needs according to the
amount of water necessary to irrigate the practicably irrigable acreage on the
reservation."5 Thus, out of a supply of an estimated 7,500,000 acre-feet of
water,"'6 the special master reserved 1,000,000 acre-feet of water for 135,000
practicably irrigable acres of reservation land." 7 The Supreme Court agreed
with this portion of the Special Master's report, stating:
We have concluded, as did the Master, that the only feasible and
fair way by which reserved water for the reservations can be
measured is irrigable acreage. The various acreages of irrigable
land which the Master found to be on the different reservations
we find to be reasonable." 8
The practicably irrigable acreage (hereinafter PIA) standard is based on an
agricultural use of the land, which assumes that agriculture was the intended
and all non-Indians of the State of Washington allocating to Indians 25% of the Ahtanum Creek
waters and 75% to non-Indian settlers, but ordering the return to the Indians any unused portion
of the 75% grant to non-Indians); United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334,
337 (9th Cir. 1939) (extending the Winters doctrine to reservations created by executive
department action without a congressional treaty or agreement); United States v. Mclntire, 101
F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939) (holding that federal reserved waters are governed by federal rather than
state law); Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921) (holding that reserved water rights
remain appurtenant to allotted land when they remain in Indian ownership but are leased to a non-
Indian); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829, 835 (9th Cir. 1908) (holding that the
Blackfeet Reservation had a paramount right to use of the Birch Creek waters to the extent
reasonably necessary for the purposes of irrigation and stock raising, domestic and other useful
purposes and providing for future adjustments in the amount of water the Indians could use);
United States v. Wightman, 230 F. 277, 283-84 (D. Ariz. 1916) (holding that non-Indians who
appropriated artesian waters from a military post on an Indian reservation could continue to use
the water after the military post was abandoned); United States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho
1928) (holding that a non-Indian purchaser of an Indian allotment located outside the reservation
boundary acquired a water right to irrigate the acreage that was under irrigation at the time title
passed from the Indians).
112. 373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree entered, 376 U.S. 340 (1964).
113. Id. at 551.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 600.
116. An acre-foot of water is 325,850 gallons, "or the amount which will cover one acre one
foot in depth." BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 25 (6th ed. 1990).
117. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 596.
118. Id. at 601.
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purpose in reserving the land. The Supreme Court in Arizona did not clearly
state whether the PIA standard would apply where the intended purpose of the
reservation was not agriculture."' The PIA standard has been criticized by
some commentators,'"m but it has generally been accepted by most authorities
as the best solution to the quantification problem,"' at least where the
intended reservation purpose was for agriculture. An inherent flaw with the
PLA standard is that it hinders tribal development by restricting tribes to
agrarian economies. This is another example of how current federal policy of
self-determination remains at odds with the Supreme Court's retention of a
past federal Indian policy, i.e., the abandoned federal policy of assimilating
the Indians into a pastoral people. The amount of water reserved under the
PIA standard, however, apparently can be used for any purpose. "
D. Jurisdiction Over Reserved Water Rights
In 1952 Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United States,
where the government owns water rights, by consenting to joinder of the
United States in state court "adjudication of rights to the use of water of a
river system or other source."'" This legislation is commonly known as the
McCarran Amendment. It took more than twenty years for the McCarran
Amendment to be used to subject Indian reserved water rights to state
jurisdiction.
In a 1971 case that did not involve Indian reserved water rights, the
Supreme Court broadly interpreted the McCarran Amendment as an "all-
inclusive statute" subjecting all water rights of the United States to general
adjudication in state proceedings regardless of how they were acquired.'"
All remaining doubts over the applicability of the McCarran Amendment to
Indian reserved water rights were eliminated in Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States,"' in which the Court held that the
119. For example, the Supreme Court did not use the PIA standard in quantifying the
reserved water for the Lake Mead National Recreation Area, the Havasu Lake National Wildlife
Refuge, or the Imperial National Wildlife Refuge. Instead it calculated the amount of reserved
water according to "annual quantities reasonably necessary to fulfill the purposes" of the reserved
federal enclave. Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 345-46 (1964). Furthermore, when the
Indian reservations attempted to reopen the decree in Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983),
serious doubts were raised regarding whether the PIA standard should or could be used in other
cases. Rusinek, supra note 106, at 370 n.90.
120. See, e.g., Susan Millington Campbell, A Proposal for the Quantification of Reserved
Indian Water Rights, 74 COLuM. L. REV. 1299, 1312 (1974).
121. Michael M. Hickey, Application of the Winters Doctrine: Quantification of the Madison
Formation, 21 S.D. L. REV. 144, 152 (1976).
122. Colville Confederated Tribe v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 758 F.2d
1324 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986).
123. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988).
124. United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 524 (1971).




McCarran Amendment extended to Indian reserved water rights." By its
nature water rights litigation places a tremendous burden on court resources,
and the Court noted that "several Southwestern States have established
elaborate procedures for allocation of water and adjudication of conflicting
claims to that resource."' 27 The Court further stated:
[W]e also find significant (a) the apparent absence of any
proceedings in the District Court, other than the filing of the
complaint, prior to the motion to dismiss, (b) the extensive
involvement of state water rights occasioned by this suit naming
1,000 defendants, (c) the 300-mile distance between the District
Court in Denver and the [state court], and (d) the existing
participation by the Government in [the state court]
proceedings."
The Court also stated, however, that the substantive reserved rights of the
Indians present federal questions that, if preserved for appeal, would continue
to be subject to Supreme Court review." Of course, state courts exercising
jurisdiction over Winters cases must apply federal common law, including all
the special canons of interpretation in regard to the federal treaties and
agreements creating the Indian reservations.'
The Colorado River decision had a tremendous impact on the adjudication
of Winters rights and resulted in water rights litigation in Arizona, Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Washington, and Wyoming.' a' For example,
in Montana the legislature enacted legislation to begin comprehensive
adjudications of Indian reserved water rights for Montana's principal
watersheds.' Harold Ranquist, a senior attorney with the Office of the
126. Id. at 810-13. Since the McCarran Amendment does not expressly mention Indian water
right, this decision departed from Supreme Court precedent that, absent an express intent by
Congress, sole jurisdiction over property rights and disputes involving Indian country rested in
federal courts. See, e.g, McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Kennerly v.
District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968);
COHEN, supra note 55, at 601 n.14; Elizabeth McCallister, Comment, Water Rights: The
McCarran Amendment and Indian Tribes' Reserved Water Rights, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 303,
303 (1976).
127. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 804.
128. Id. at 820.
129. Id. at 813. However, as noted in Cohen's Handbook, "The efficacy of this solution may
be doubted ... particularly when the quantification of reserved water rights is predicated on
complex factual determinations." COHEN, supra note 55, at 601-02 (citing Wilson v. Omaha
Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 673-74 (1979)).
130. See, e.g., State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754,
763, 765-66 (Mont. 1985).
131. Robert D. Dellwo, Recent Developments in the Northwest Indian Water Rights, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 101, 112-13 (1980).
132. Id.
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Solicitor in the Department of Interior, in a memorandum to the United States
Solicitor, aptly stated: "The case of Colorado River Water Conservancy
District et al v. United States hangs like the sword of Damocles over
proceedings to determine the measure of reserved water rights of reservations
for which the Department of Interior is responsible."'3
In Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,'" the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its decision in Colorado River, stating:
The McCarran Amendment, as interpreted in Colorado River,
allows and encourages state courts to undertake the task of
quantifying Indian water rights in the course of comprehensive
water adjudications. Although adjudication of those rights in
federal court instead might in the abstract be practical, and even
wise, it will be neither practical nor wise as long as it creates the
possibility of duplicative litigation, tension and controversy
between the federal and state forums, hurried and pressured
decisionmaking, and confusion over the disposition of property
rights.'35
After Colorado River and Arizona, the federal courts have, for the most part,
withdrawn from Indian reserved water rights cases and deferred to state courts
which have undertaken comprehensive adjudication of water rights.36
Groundwater issues would appear to fall within the plain language of the
McCarran Amendment, which confers jurisdiction to adjudicate water rights
"of a river system or other source.""'j3 In short, the determination of whether
Indian reserved water rights includes groundwater is occurring in state courts,
such as those of Wyoming in the Big Horn case. Not surprisingly, as
happened in Big Horn, some state courts are unlikely to recognize a reserved
tribal right to groundwater.
]Idaho provides another example of how states can use the McCarran
Amendment. Idaho passed legislation in 1985 directing the adjudication of all
133. Id. at 112 (quoting Internal Office Memoranda, Dep't of Interior (Dec. 6, 1976)).
134. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
135. Id. at 569.
136. CANBY, supra note 57, at 293. A few federal courts have succeeded in retaining
jurisdiction over Indian Winters claims. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1400-07
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied 'sub nom. 467 U.S. 1252 (1984) (concluding that district court
retention of jurisdiction in some circumstances, as described in Colorado River, can avoid
duplicative state court proceedings and piecemeal determination of water rights).
137. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988) (emphasis added). But see Stephen M. Feldman, The Supreme
Court's New Sovereign Immunity Doctrine and the McCarran Amendment: Toward Ending State
Adjudication of Indian Water Rights, 18 HARV. ENVTL L. REv. 433, 484-86 (1994) (discussing
how the McCarran Amendment can be construed as not waiving sovereign immunity with respect




United States and Indian water claims in the Snake River Basin.138 The
Idaho statute states:
Effective management in the public interest of the waters of the
Snake River basin requires that a comprehensive determination of
the nature, extent and priority of the rights of all users of surface
and ground water from that system be determined. Therefore, the
director of the department of water resources shall petition the
district court to commence an adjudication within the terms of the
McCarran amendment, 43 U.S.C. section 666 ....
The legislation, which compelled appearance of the United States in the Snake
River Basin adjudication, was upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court.140 Later
in the case, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Idaho
Supreme Court on the issue of whether the McCarran Amendment waived the
United States sovereign immunity with respect to payment of filing fees of
$10 million.'4' The Idaho water rights legislation required all claimants to
pay filing fees (even though the United States was compelled to participate
as an indispensable party) to cover the cost of the adjudication, and the Idaho
Supreme Court concluded that the McCarran Amendment did, indeed, waive
the federal government's sovereign immunity. Justice Johnson dissented from
the Idaho decision, explaining:
The "filing fees" the state seeks to charge the United States are
not the usual modest fees for filing pleadings in a lawsuit. The
"filing fees" at issue here exceed TEN MILLION DOLLARS! Of
this amount, eight and one-half million dollars represent "filing
fees" for the adjudication of "reserved" rights .... 142
The United States Supreme Court concluded that while the United States can
be compelled to participate in state water adjudications, the United States
cannot be forced by states to finance their adjudication of Indian reserved
water rights.'43
138. IDAHO CODE § 42-1406A (1990).
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. In re Snake River Basin Water Sys., 764 P.2d 78 (Idaho 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1005 (1989).
141. United States v. Idaho, 113 S. Ct. 1893 (1993), rev'g In re Snake River Basin Water
Sys., 832 P.2d 289 (Idaho 1992).
142. hI re Snake River Basin Water Sys., 832 P.2d 289, 300 (Idaho 1992) (Johnson, J.,
dissenting). The Idaho Supreme Court noted that "reserved" rights generally "consist of those
rights reserved by treaty with the Indians." Id. at 293.
143. United States v. Idaho, 113 S. Ct. at 1897.
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V. The Groundwater Loophole
As noted at the outset, the issue of whether the reserved water right of
Indian reservations applies to groundwater has never been directly decided by
the Supreme Court. This "loophole" in Indian reserved water rights, however,
has been addressed by a number of federal and state courts.
A. Federal Cases
The first federal cases applying the Winters doctrine to groundwater
concerned land reserved for military installations. In United States v.
Fallbrook Public Utility District,'" the district court recognized, in accord
with California law . regarding interrelated waters, that groundwaters
hydrologically connected to surface waters were part of the federal reserved
water right attached to the Camp Pendleton military base.' State ex rel.
Shamberger v. United States'" held that the federal government could use
underground or percolating waters located under land reserved for the
Hawthorne Naval Ammunition Depot without obtaining permission from the
State of Nevada.47
In the first case examining the issue of groundwater rights within an Indian
reservation, the Montana district court in Tweedy v. Texas Co.' stated in
dicta, "The Winters case dealt only with the surface water, but the same
implications which led the Supreme Court to hold that surface waters had
been reserved would apply to underground waters as well.'. 49 In Tweedy, the
court denied recovery to the Blackfeet Indians, due to a lack of proof, against
an oil and gas lessee who used groundwater underlying non-Indian surface
owners' lands within the Blackfeet Indian Reservation in Montana.'
The Supreme Court appeared to settle by implication the Indian reserved
groundwater rights issue in Cappaert v. United States,"' although the case
did not deal with an Indian reservation. At issue in Cappaert was the reserved
water right for Devil's Hole National Monument, which was established by
Congress in 1952 to preserve a unique desert pupfish found in a subterranean
pool.'" The Cappaerts began pumping groundwater for irrigation under a
State of Nevada permit, thereby causing a decrease in the water level of the
144. 165 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. Calif. 1958).
145. Id. at 838-39, 847.
146. 165 F. Supp. 600 (D. Nev. 1958), affd on other grounds, 279 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1960).
147. Id. at 610-11.
148. 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968).
149. Id. at 385.
150. Id. at 386-87.
151. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).




pupfish pool." The Supreme Court upheld a permanent injunction granted
to the United States to stop the Cappaerts' pumping.'" In upholding the
permanent injunction, Chief Justice Burger wrote for a unanimous Court,
"[S]ince the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is based on the
necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation, we hold that the
United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the
diversion is of surface or groundwater."55
In United States v. Bel Bay Community & Water Association," the
district court granted the Lummi Tribe partial summary judgment on the issue
of the tribe's power to regulate groundwater under non-Indian held land within
the external boundaries of the Lummi Indian Reservation.'" Later in the
case, however, the district court reversed itself due to concerns about tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.'
The dispute in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton" concerned the
Colville Indian Reservation's rights to water from No Name Creek, which was
found to be hydrologically connected to an underlying aquifer."° The tribe
brought suit in 1970 to enjoin the non-Indian owners of allotted lands within
the reservation from using No Name Creek water reserved to the tribe.'
The district court held that the Indian reserved water right was limited to
Indians and did not pass to non-Indians with the title to alienated Indian
lands." Additionally, the district court relied on Cappaert in holding that
Indian reserved water rights extended to groundwater."
In United States v. Anderson,' a district court recognized that the
Spokane Tribe of Indians had a reserved right to groundwater in the
Chamokane water basin located in the northeastern part of Washington.'"
153. Id.
154. Id. at 137-38.
155. Id. at 143.
156. 5 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) F-43 (W.D. Wash. 1978).
157. Id. at F-44.
158. Dellwo, supra note 131, at 106 (citing Bel Bay, 5 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law.
Training Program) at F-198). Oliphant held that Indian tribal courts lack criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians on Indian reservations. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
159. 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978), affd in part and rev'd in part, 647 F.2d 42 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
160. Id. at 1323.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1328.
163. Id. at 1326.
164. 591 F. Supp. I (E.D. Wash. 1982).
165. The case was originally decided by the Hon. Marshall A. Neill on July 23, 1979, in an
unpublished opinion. Soon thereafter District Judge Neill died, and the parties filed motions to
amend and supplement the judgment. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. at 3. District Judge Neill also
presided over Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320 (E.D. Wash. 1978).
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The United States filed suit in 1972 for a water rights adjudication of the
Chamokane water basin on behalf of the Spokane Tribe."6 After extensive
proceedings the court determined that portions of the Chamokane Creek were
interrelated with groundwater aquifers and that groundwater withdrawals by
the tribe in the Mid-Chamokane area reduced the water flow downstream.67
The tribe, which intervened in the action, obtained quantified amounts of
groundwater and surface water for fishing and agricultural irrigati6n.'" The
quantified amount is subject to future modification if the tribe shows a
"substantial change in circumstances" resulting in a greater water need for the
tribe to meet the "primary purposes for creating the reservation."'"9 The
district court also held that the tribe could transfer reserved water quantified
for irrigation to fishing uses."'
As discussed earlier, the United States Claims Court stated in Gila River
Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States"' that the Gila River
tribes had a reserved groundwater right to the extent that the tribes could
beneficially use the water."
Thus, the Supreme Court implied in Cappaert, and several lower federal
courts have held, that the Indian reserved water right extends to groundwater.
B. Disagreement of Legal Commentators
Many legal commentators assumed that Cappaert was a de facto
determination of the issue of Indian groundwater rights.' The logical
assumption of these legal commentators is that just as the federal reserved
water right of Indians carried over to other federal enclaves, the extension of
the: federal reserved right to groundwater in a non-Indian case (Cappaert)
would carry back to Indian reservations. Certainly one could presume the
Supreme Court would recognize a groundwater right for Indian reservations
166. 591 F. Supp. at 3.
167. Id. at 4.
168. Id. at 5, 8. Remarkably, the quantification of the fishing water right was found to be
dependent on maintaining a proper water temperature for the tribe's fish hatchery, rather than on
a minimum flow for actual fishing. Id. at 5.
169. Id. at 8.
170. Id. at 7 (citing Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (198 1)).
171. 9 CI. Ct. 660 (1986), affd, 877 F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
172. Id. at 699-700.
173. See CANBY, supra note 57, at 284; COHEN, supra note 55, at 585-86; Marc P. Bouret,
Cappaert v. United States: A Dehydration of Private Groundwater Use?, 14 CAL. W. L. REv.
382, 390 (1978); Paige Graening, Judicial Failure to Recognize A Reserved Groundwater Right
for the Wind River Indian Reservation, Wyoming, 27 TULSA L.J. 1, 10 n.59 (1991); Hickey, supra
not- 121, at 149; Aaron H. Hostyk, Who Controls the Water?, 18 TULSA L.J. 1, 51 (1982);
Robert S. Pelcyger, The Winters Doctrine and the Greening of the Reservations, 4 J. CONTEMP.
L. 19, 24-25 (1977); A. Dan Tarlock, One River, Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate Water
Rights, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 631, 647 (1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss2/4
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since, in an opinion for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Burger recognized a
reserved groundwater right for pupfish.
A few legal commentators have disagreed, however. Most notable was Dean
Charles J. Meyers, who wrote:
Early readings of Cappaert led me to believe that just as Indian
water rights under Winters provided the foundation for federal
reserved water rights on non-Indian reservations, federal
groundwater rights on a National Monument under Cappaert would
provide the basis for Indian groundwater rights.
I no longer hold that view. I would argue that when an Indian
Reservation was created, whether by treaty, statute or executive
order, a property interest comparable to a fee simple absolute was
set aside in trust for the tribe. The Indians own the beneficial
interest in all the resources on their land: soil, oil and gas, coal,
other minerals and groundwater."
Dean Meyers favors treating groundwater as a property interest because it
eliminates the whole reserved rights problem, which he argues will lead to
maximized productivity and equitable distribution of groundwater. 75 However,
returning groundwater to the domain of states while reserving surface waters
would create a bifurcated Indian water rights system, which would muddle water
disputes where surface water and groundwater are interconnected. Efficient
water management with equitable water distribution will result only when legal
systems treat surface water and groundwater uniformly.
C. State Approaches to Indian Reserved Groundwater Rights
The Colorado River decision resulted in a proliferation of water rights
litigation in the western states."76 This section will examine a cursory sampling
of the state approaches to Indian reserved water rights. The states examined are
Arizona, Montana, and Wyoming.
174. Meyers, supra note 16, at 38; see Gwendolyn Griffith, Indian Claims to Groundwater:
Reserved Rights or Beneficial Interest?, 33 STAN. L. REV. 103, 113 (1980); Note, Federal
Reserved Rights to Underground Water- A Rising Question in the Arid West, 43 UTAH L. REv.
43, 52-53 (1973).
175. Meyers, supra note 16, at 38-89.
176. Dellwo, supra note 131, at 112-13. See generally A. Lynne Krough, Water Right
Adjudication in the Western States: Procedures, Constitutionality, Problems & Solutions, 30
LAND & WATER L. REV. 9 (1995) (providing a comprehensive review of water rights adjudication
in western states).
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1. Arizona
Arizona is facing a water crisis. Water usage in the state exceeds by three
times the available surface water supply in normal years, with groundwater
pumping making up the shortfall.'" The legislature's concern about the
depletion of the groundwater supply led to the passage of a comprehensive
groundwater management law that gradually reduces groundwater pumping.'
As a result of demand greatly exceeding supply, junior-appropriators will be left
with no water in the future; therefore, it has been critical for Arizona to
determine the priorities and quantification of water rights."
The primary source of Indian water rights litigation stems from the San
Carlos and Tonte tribes on the Fort Apache Indian Reservation. The Tonte
Apache tribe is rather small, but the San Carlos Apache tribe has approximately
8000 members on a reservation of more than two million acres in east-central
Arizona." The tribes have reserved right claims on the Gila River watershed,
including the main stream of the Gila River and its tributaries.' These
tributaries include the San Carlos, Black, Salt, San Simon, San Francisco, and
Verde rivers.'" In 1935, the United States stipulated to a decree on behalf of
the Gila River tribes, which established their right to the waters of the Gila
River with an "immemorial date of priority.""'
:in 1974 the Salt River Valley Water Users Association brought suit, under
Arizona's general stream adjudication laws,'" through the State Land
Department."0 The Department informed the United States and the Gila River
tribes that they were required to file claims in the action. In response, the Indian
tribes filed a variety of actions in federal district court.'" The federal district
court denied relief based on the state court's jurisdiction under the McCarran
Amendment and in the interest of conserving judicial resources." Though the
177. United States v. Superior Court, 697 P.2d 658, 663 (Ariz. 1985).
178. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-401 to -637 (1994).
179. Superior Court, 697 P.2d at 663.
180. Id. at 662.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., Globe Equity Decree No. 59 (D. Ariz. June
29, 1935). The federal government negotiated this decree without the consent of the tribes, and
it hns been criticized for conceding a major share of the tribe's water rights. LLOYD BURTON,
AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RicHTS AND THiE LIMITs OF LAW 65 (1991). The tribes have never
accepted the decree and have been in litigation for decades over Gila River water rights. Id.
184. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-231 to -245 (1994), repealed and superseded by ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-251 to -260 (1994). Approximately 80.000 claimants have been served
for general adjudication of water rights under this statute. United States v. Superior Court,
Maricopa County, 697 P.2d 658, 662 (Ariz. 1985).
185. Superior Court, 697 P.2d at 663-64.
186. Id.




Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, the Ninth Circuit
itself was reversed by the Supreme Court.'" The case was then remanded to
state court.
Back in state court in 1985, the case had been pending for ten years with an
estimated twenty more years for a final determination.' The Arizona Supreme
Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Maricopa County"9
as well as the constitutionality of the proceedings under the due process
clause.' The Superior Court then made some preliminary determinations on
the relationship between surface water and groundwater to narrow the issues
presented in the general adjudication."9 Arizona is one of the few western
states to adhere to a bifurcated system of water rights, whereby the prior
appropriation doctrine applies to surface waters and groundwater belongs to the
overlying landowner as limited by the doctrine of reasonable use." To further
complicate Arizona's water rights doctrine, the Arizona Supreme Court deems
appropriable groundwater pumping that draws appreciably from the flow of
surface water."s The Superior Court in Gila River created a test, which it
acknowledged was arbitrary, for determining when groundwater becomes
appropriable due to pumping that appreciably diminishes the flow of the surface
water.'95 The Arizona Supreme Court reversed, holding that "any appropriate
F. Supp. 778, 784 (D. Ariz. 1980), rev'd sub nora. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 668 F.2d
1093 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). Also, the district court stayed, pending the
results of the comprehensive adjudication, the Gila River Indian Community's complaint that
various upper valley defendants were pumping groundwater interconnected with the Gila River
in violation of the Equity Decree that they were granted in 1935. United States v. Gila Valley
Irrigation Dist., 959 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming the stay order).
188. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). The Supreme Court held
that disclaimers in state enabling acts, which required states entering the Union to disclaim any
interest in Indian lands, were irrelevant to state court jurisdiction under the McCarran
Amendment. Id. at 561-65.
189. Superior Court, 697 P.2d at 662.
190. Id.
191. In re Rights to the Use of the Gila River, 830 P.2d 442 (Ariz. 1992).
192. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and
Source, 857 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc).
193. Id. at 1238-40. The Arizona Supreme Court has struggled a great deal with this
doctrine, conceding that it is based on inaccurate and dated scientific data. Id. at 1240 (analyzing
in detail the original bifurcation doctrine case, Maricopa County v. Southwest Cotton Co., 4 P.2d
369 (Ariz. 1931)). In 1952, by a 3-2 margin the court changed the rule to make groundwater
subject to appropriation. Bristor v. Cheatham, 240 P.2d 185 (Ariz. 1952). Fourteen months later
the court reversed itself again by a 3-2 margin and reinstated the bifurcated water system. Bristor
v. Cheatham, 255 P.2d 173 (Ariz. 1953). See generally Robert J. Glennon & Thomas Maddock
III, In Search of Subflow: Arizona's Futile Effort to Separate Groundwater from Surface Water,
36 ARIz. L. REv. 567 (1994) (discussing various problems with the Arizona bifurcated system,
particularly in regard to environmental effects and the federal reserved water rights doctrine).
194. Gila River, 857 P.2d at 1242.
195. Id. at 1239. Prior to this test, the Arizona courts took a narrow interpretation of this
"subflow" appropriation doctrine. Id. at 1242, 1247. This narrow interpretation was important in
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change in existing law must come from the legislature.""'t The court then
stated:
In this field, we not only confer private rights and interests but deal
in the very survival of our society and its economy. Simply put,
there is not enough water to go around. All must compromise and
some must sacrifice. Definition of those boundaries is peculiarly a
function for the legislature. It is plainly not a judicial task.
Accordingly, we must look to the legislature to enact laws they
deem appropriate for wise use and management.'"
The Arizona Supreme Court did, however, find enough judicial discretion to
overrule the objections of the United States and the tribes regarding the Superior
Caurt's decision to exclude from the "comprehensive" adjudication wells having
a de minimis effect on the water system." Thus, well owners pumping de
minimis amounts were granted "summary adjudication" of their groundwater
rights.1"
Absent a legislative change to Arizona's bifurcated water system, the
groundwater rights of Indian reservations will not be subject to the prior
appropriation doctrine. Of course, hydrologically connected surface water and
groundwater are syphoned off each other when pumped or appropriated."w As
a result, the Gila River tribes could end up gaining or losing substantial
quantities of water where the Gila River waters are hydrologically connected to
groundwaters. For example, de minimis groundwater pumping could
substantially affect- surface water quantities when taken as a whole, or the
appropriation of Gila River water feeding reservation aquifers could end up
depleting those aquifers.
Congress also has been active in settling Indian water rights in Arizona to
end water rights litigation. In 1978 Congress ratified an agreement settling the
water right claims of the Ak-Chin Indian community against the United
States.' In the agreement, the United States admits failing to fulfill its trust
obligations to the tribe by "allowing ground water beneath the reservation to be
mined." In exchange for the tribes waiving all water rights claims, the
United States agreed to construct "a well field and water delivery system from
that it would have excluded most hydrologically connected groundwater underlying the Indian
reservation from the prior appropriation doctrine.
196. Id. at 1247.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1248.
199. Id.
200. Grant, supra note 22, at 64.






nearby Federal lands" and "to meet the Ak-Chin community's needs for a
permanent supply of water in a fixed amount."'
Congress passed the Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of
1982 to settle the claims of the Papago Tribe in regard to the San Xavier
Reservation and the Sells Papago Reservation.' The Act granted the tribe the
right to withdraw groundwater, but it also contained a provision stating that such
a right shall not be "construed to establish whether or not the Federal reserved
rights doctrine applies, or does not apply, to ground water."' Finally, in
another water settlement agreement, Congress enacted the Salt River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988.=
2. Montana
There are seven Indian reservations in Montana with tribal reserved water
rights claims on the Big Horn River and Tongue River in Yellowstone Basin,
the Milk and St. Mary river systems, the Big Muddy and Poplar river systems,
the tributaries of the Missouri River, the Flathead River system, the Marias
River system, Flathead Lake with the Flathead River system, and the Kootenai
River.' The seven Indian reservations are of considerable size, and "the
potential amount of water reserved is tremendous."'
In the Water Use Act of 1973,2"0 the Montana legislature declared all waters
within the state to be the property of the state and subject to appropriation for
beneficial use.2"' The Act was amended in 1979 to include, under the
McCarran Amendment, federal and Indian reserved surface water and
groundwater rights in state proceedings for the general adjudication of existing
water rights, either as claims or by compact.2 The Montana Attorney
General, as required by the amendment,2 3 began proceedings in state court to
adjudicate the federal and Indian surface water and groundwater rights
claims!"1
In apparent reaction to the Montana move for jurisdiction over Indian water
rights, the United States brought actions in federal court to adjudicate the water
203. Id.
204. Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1274. See infra notes 292-96 and accompanying text
(discussing this negotiated settlement).
205. Id § 301.
206. Id. § 303(e).
207. Pub. L. No. 100-512, 102 Stat. 2549 (1988).
208. State ex reL Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754,758-59
(Mont. 1985).
209. Id.
210. 1973 Mont. Laws ch. 452 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-101 (1985)).
211. Id.
212. 1979 Mont. Laws ch. 697 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 3-7-101 to -502, 85-2-211
to -243, 85-2-701 to -704, 2-15-212 (1985)).
213. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-701 to -704 (1985).
214. State ex rel. Greely v. Water Court, 691 P.2d 833, 835-36 (Mont. 1984).
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rights of Indian tribes."' The district court dismissed the suits in the interest
of "wisejudicial administration" because of the comprehensive state adjudication
procedure.21 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the McCarran
Amendment merely extended the consent of the United States to be sued but did
not repeal federal jurisdiction.2 7 The Supreme Court reversed in Arizona v.
San Carlos Apache Tribe,2 ' holding that the district court was "correct in
deferring to the state proceedings.""2 9
In a well-reasoned decision at a later stage of the adjudication, the Montana
Supreme Court validated the water court's jurisdiction and set forth ground rules
for any future state court adjudication.m The court stated that the priority right
date would depend on the nature and purpose of the right."' Additionally, the
priority right date would be the date the reservation was created if the intended
reserved use did not exist prior to the creation of the reservation, but preexisting
tribal uses would have an aboriginal priority date, characterized as "time
immemorial." An example of such a "time immemorial" right would be
water reserved for hunting and fishing.m The court also stated that the PIA
standard would apply to current and future irrigation of reserved lands intended
for agriculture.'m Citing to the Winters language in regard to the purpose of
the Fort Belknap Reservation, however, the court stated, "[I]t may be that...
'acts of civilization' will include consumptive uses for industrial purposes."m
The Montana Supreme Court's statement that it might look beyond the PIA
standard in court proceedings could be viewed as increasing tribal bargaining
power with the state. Additionally, the court stated that while "the Water Use
Act of Montana does not explicitly state that the Water Court shall apply federal
law in adjudicating Indian reserved rights ... [w]e hold that state courts are
required to follow federal law with regard to those water rights."'
215. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Tongue River Water Users Ass'n, 484 F. Supp. 31 (D.
Mont. 1979), rev'dsub nom Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982),
rev'd and remanded sub non. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 464 U.S. 545 (1983), district
court affd, Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit, 713 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1983).
216. Id. at 34-35.
217. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir 1982).
213. 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
219. Id. at 570.
220. State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754 (Mont.
1985).
221. Id. at 764.
222. Id.
223. Id. (citing United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1412-15 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1252 (1984)).
224. Id. at 765.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 765-66. The court also said that the water court should take care so the water




Unfortunately, the court did not discuss whether groundwater was included in
the Indian reserved water right.
In 1979, the Montana Reserved Water Rights Compact Commission
commenced negotiations for settlement of the Indian water rights claims with
all but one Montana Indian tribe.' Further, pursuant to a Water Use Law
provision that encourages settlement negotiations, the state adjudications for
those tribes engaging in negotiations have been suspended until July 1, 1999.'
The Montana negotiations have resulted in settlements with the tribes of two
Indian reservations but apparently continue for tribes of the remaining
reservations. The Assinibone and Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Indian Reservation
executed a settlement compact with Montana in April, 1985.' The compact
included a quantified reservation, held in trust by the United States, of surface
water from the Missouri River and certain tributaries, plus groundwater beneath
the reservation.'
The Northern Cheyenne Tribe compact with Montana was approved in May
1991, by the Montana State Legislature and the Northern Cheyenne Tribal
Council.' On September 30, 1992, Congress ratified the compact 2 This
compact also recognized a quantified reserved groundwater right for the
Northern Cheyenne Tribe. 3
While neither the Montana legislature nor the Montana Supreme Court
explicitly conceded reserved groundwater rights to Indian reservations, the State
of Montana has recognized the Indian reserved groundwater right in negotiated
water claim settlements. Montana also established a groundwater monitoring
program in 1991, which includes the participation of Indian tribes.'
227. State ex rel. Greely v. Water Court, 691 P.2d at 836.
228. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-217 (Supp. 1992) (as amended effective May 17, 1991).
229. Id. § 85-20-201. Article 12 provided that "this compact shall have no force and effect
until ... approved by the Montana Legislature and submitted to Congress." Id. § 85-20-201, art.
12(B)(2). The Montana legislature approved the compact and filed it with the Secretary of State
on April 30, 1985, who then submitted copies to Congress on June 12, 1985. Id. § 85-20-201
compiler's comments. However, the compact was never ratified by Congress. Legal commentators
have stated that it is probable that the State of Montana and the tribes structured the compact so
that congressional approval was not necessary. BURTON, supra note 183, at 79. The water
compact, however, was approved by the U.S. Attorney and the Secretary of the Interior. Id.
230. Id. § 85-20-201, art. Il1(A).
231. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-301 (Supp. 1992).
232. Northern Cheyenne Indian Reserved Water Rights Settlement Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-374, 106 Stat. 1186.
233. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-301, art. 2(A)(4) (Supp. 1992).
234. Id. § 85-2-906.
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3. Wyoming
The Wind River Indian Reservation, which comprises approximately 4000
square miles of land within Wyoming, is home to Shoshone, Bannock, and
Axapahoe tribes.' The Wyoming legislature authorized the State to commence
general adjudications of water rights on January 22, 1977, and the state
commenced the Big Horn litigation on January 24, 1977.
An attempt by the United States to remove the litigation to federal court
failed, as did its state court jurisdictional challenge.' In November 1977, the
tribes were permitted to intervene.' A special master was appointed, and
the trial occurred from January to December of 1981.a' The special master's
451-page report, covering four years of conferences and hearings with more than
100 attorneys, included more than 15,000 pages of transcripts and over 2300
exhibits.242 The special master found the Wind River Indian Reservation had
a reserved water right and determined the purpose of the reservation was to
establish a permanent Indian homeland. 3 The special master quantified and
awarded reserved water rights for irrigation, stock watering, fisheries, wildlife
and aesthetics, mineral and industrial uses, and domestic, commercial, and
municipal uses.' The district court and the Wyoming Supreme Court rejected
these findings, concluding instead that the intent behind the Wind River Indian
Reservation treaty was "to create a reservation with a sole agricultural
purpose."'z  Thus, the court decided that a reserved water right existed only
for agricultural irrigation, stock watering, and domestic, commercial, and
municipal uses.
235. Established by the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger with the Shoshone and Bannock
Indians on July 3, 1868. An Arapahoe tribe was relocated to the reservation in 1878.
236. In re Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76, 83 (Wyo. 1988), affid mem. by an equally
divided Court sub nor. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
237. Id. at 84. See generally Michelle Knapik, Note, Who Shall Administer Water Rights on
the Wind River Reservation: Has Wyoming Halted an Environmentally Sound Indian Water
Maragement System?, 12 TEMPLE ENvTL. L. & TECH J. 233 (1993) (providing a detailed
examination of the Big Horn River System water rights adjudication).
238. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 84.
239. Id.
240. The United States was required to pay one-half the special masteres fees and expenses.
The motion of the United States for reimbursement in 1985 was denied, as was its appeal in Big
Horn. ld. at 86, 116. Contra United States v. Idaho, 113 S. Ct. 1893 (1993).




245. Id. at 96.
246. Id. at 98-99. The court rejected water rights for fishing, mineral and industrial uses, and
wildlife and aesthetic uses, even though the Wind River Indian Reservation treaty mentioned
hunting, lumbering and milling, and roaming. Id. at 95-97. This apparently contradicts the canons
of construction formulated by the Supreme Court for interpreting Indian treaties. The court also
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss2/4
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Furthermore, the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
determination that Indian reserved water rights did not include groundwater.' 7
It so held, in spite of admitting:
The logic which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation also supports reservation of
groundwater. Certainly the two sources are often interconnected.
See § 41-3-916, W.S. 1977 (where underground and surface waters
are "so interconnected as to constitute in fact one source of supply,"
a single schedule of priorities shall be made),'
Nonetheless, the court reasoned that it would not recognize an Indian reserved
groundwater right in the absence of other cases directly applying the Indian
reserved water rights doctrine to groundwater. "49 Then, the court stated, "The
State has not appealed the decision that the Tribes may continue to satisfy their
domestic and livestock needs (part of the agricultural award) from existing wells
at current withdrawal rates; therefore, we do not address that question."'
Thus, the court affirmed the district court's holding that rejected the inclusion
of groundwater in the Indian reserved water right, yet which awarded the
Indians priority rights to current groundwater withdrawal rates.
An equally divided Supreme Court"' affirmed without a written
opinionm' Apparently, the groundwater right issue was not raised on
appeals 3 and there apparently was no mention of reserved groundwater rights
during oral arguments?" Thus, the Supreme Court's evenly divided affirmation
of Big Horn provides no insight into the issues of Indian reserved groundwater
rights.
VI. Settlements of Indian Water Claims
The most logical and efficient approach to Indian surface water and
groundwater rights claims is through negotiated settlement. As noted by
Professor David H. Getches:
rejected the relevance of the tribes' use of water for mineral and industrial purposes since the
1868 treaty. Id. at 98. The word "hunting" in Indian treaties, in accord with the canons of
construction, has been construed to include fishing. State v. Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386 (Idaho 1972).
247. Big Horn, 753 P.2d at 98.
248. Id. at 99 (citations omitted).
249. Id. at 100.
250. Id.
251. Justice O'Connor recused herself from the opinion. Rusinek, supra note 106, at 404.
Justice O'Connor, however, did actively participate in the Wyoming v. United States oral
argument,. Id. at 399.
252. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 406 (1989).
253. Rusinek, supra note 106, at 394-97.
254. Id. at 398-405.
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Because water, like wildlife management and land use control,
needs to be managed on as unified a basis as possible, it is an area
particularly susceptible to negotiated resolution. In the long run, the
administrative details of managing water on [reservations] will have
to be settled by agreements of the governments in question.'
Negotiated settlements of Indian water claims have become immensely
important since the Supreme Court has expressed a preference for state
adjudication of federal reserved water claims, which opened the floodgates to
Indian water rights adjudications. Negotiated settlements also have considerable
advantages over adjudications, including savings in time, money, and effort.
Negotiated settlements also provide the advantage of allowing the parties, rather
than a court, to achieve compromises that fit their individual needs.' For
exmnple, the Winters doctrine generated a basic dilemma in that "two sovereigns
simply cannot impose conflicting standards upon a geographically unified
resource such as water."' Absent cooperative regulatory efforts, states and
Indian tribes would likely develop very different approaches to regulating their
interconnected water systems.
Federal, state, and tribal governments all play vital roles in water settlement
negotiations. States and Indian tribes have discovered through negotiations that
they share a mutual interest in minimizing conflicts and achieving equitable
settlements. The federal government has the most complex role, since it
must protect the interests of the nation, while at the same time maintain its
trustee role with respect to tribes.
A. States and Tribes
The Western States Water Council for the Western Governors Association
undertook a study in 1984 in an attempt to quantify Indian water claims in
fifteen western states.' The study found that the tribal claims accounted for
255. David H. Getches, Negotiated Sovereignty: Intergovernmental Agreements with
American Indian Tribes as Models for Expanding First Nations' Self-Government, I REV. CONST.
STUD. 120, 159 (1993); see SLY, supra note 88, at 12, 192-93.
256. John A. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve Water Disputes
Inv'ving Indian Rights, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 63, 63 (1988).
257. DAVID H. GETCHES Er AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 832 (3d ed.
1993); Michael F. Lamb, Adjudication of Indian Water Rights: Implementation of the 1979
Amendments to the Montana Water Use Act, 41 MONT. L. REV. 73, 89 (1980).
258. Susan Williams, Indian Winters Water Rights Administration: Averting New War, 11
Pull. LAND L. REV. 53, 61-62 (1990). Williams notes that "surface and groundwaters are
intimately interrelated, and water follows no political boundaries." Id.
259. John E. Thorson, Resolving Conflicts Through IntergovernmentalAgreements: The Pros
and Cons of Negotiated Settlements, in INDIAN WATER 1985: COLLECTED ESSAYS 25, 30
(Christine L. Miklas et al. eds., 1986). Thorson's article also contains a lucid explanation of the
cla.;hing tribal and state interests in water rights disputes. Id. at 28-30.




a significant portion of the unused water resources in each state, and in some
states the tribal claims exceeded the total available unused water. 1 Because
of the shortfall in existing unused water for covering pending Indian water
claims, resolution of disputes may require in some cases the reallocation of
water from non-Indian to Indian uses. The reallocation of water poses
difficult political barriers for state officials who face hostility from non-Indian
water users who think Indians are receiving special treatment.0 2
In spite of the obstacles, progress is being made in some states. In 1982-
1983, the Western Regional Council and The Western Governors Policy
Office announced their support for negotiation of Indian water claims.' A
few states, such as Montana, have taken very aggressive approaches to forging
settlements with tribes, while other states, such as Wyoming, appear more
prone toward litigation. As of March 1987, negotiation of Indian water rights
claims were underway in Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and New
Mexico.' 4
Many tribal leaders maintain that water rights are critical for developing
tribal economies and preserving cultural identities. Tribal leaders who
decide to negotiate sometimes face criticisms that they are "selling out,"'
or are negotiating another bad deal for the tribe. These inferences are often
justified in light of the legacy of state and federal governments in fashioning
inequitable agreements and reneging on past promise.
The prospects of "success" for Indian tribes through litigation have
decreased with the Colorado River, Arizona, and Big Horn decisions. Some
tribes have chosen to negotiate rather than risk litigating the applicability of
the Winters doctrine to groundwater.' Also, tribes have shied away from
litigating the groundwater issue because of the expense of collecting adequate
groundwater data. 9 The threat of litigation, however, remains a substantial
bargaining chip of tribes in settlement negotiations. Additionally,
comprehensive federal and state economic development packages for tribes
can result from negotiated settlements. Therefore, the gains resulting from
261. Id. at 94-95.
262. Id. at 32-33.
263. Folk-Williams, supra note 256, at 64 n.7.
264. Id. at 65.
265. AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INDIAN WATER POLICY IN A
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 56-58, 68-73 (1982). See generally Peterson Zah, Water: Key to Tribal
Economic Development, in INDIAN WATER 1985: COLLECTED ESSAYS 75 (Christine L. Miklas
et al. eds., 1986). Zah, Chairman of the Navajo Nation, notes that the decision to negotiate water
rights is a decision for each tribe to make, and he expresses a concern that a single federal policy
of negotiation compromises tribal bargaining power. Id.
266. GETCHES ET AL., supra note 257, at 832.
267. Thorson, supra note 259, at 25.
268. Id. at 43.
269. Id.
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negotiation appear to be enough for tribal leaders to face the political
obstacles of engaging in negotiated settlements.
B. The Executive Branch
The conflict between the Indian and state water interests is viewed by
Indians and states as the result of federal actions.270 This blame on the
federal government is well founded since, even after the Winters case, the
federal government encouraged settlement and development of the West
without first resolving Indian water rights issues. Consequently, states and
Indian tribes argue that the federal government should finance the cost of
resolving the disputes. Meanwhile, the federal government has attempted to
limit its liability through negotiated settlements."'
Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan both issued policy statements
favoring negotiated settlements over litigation of reserved water rights
disputes.2" The Secretary of the Interior announced a preference of
negotiated settlement to Indian water claims as federal policy on July 14,
1982, and formed the Federal Water Policy Advisory Group. 3
President George Bush made a statement when signing into law the 1989
Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act274 that "disputes regarding Indian
water rights should be resolved through negotiated settlements rather than
litigation."' 5  In accord with President Bush's statement, the Interior
Department's Working Group in Indian Water Settlements promulgated federal
government criteria and procedures for participating in Indian water rights
settlement negotiations." 6 The criteria declare that completed settlements
should resolve all outstanding water claims so that "finality is achieved."2"
Additionally, the criteria state that "[t]he total cost of a settlement to all




The federal executive policy of favoring negotiated water settlements,
which were supported by Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush, is unlikely to
change as a result of a turnover in presidential administrations. The remaining
question for the executive branch is how active the Department of Interior will
270. Folk-Williams, supra note 256, at 68-69.
271. Id. at 69.
272. SLY, supra note 88, at 93 n.98 (citing President Carter, Federal Water Policy, 14
WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 1044, 1050 (1978); President Reagan, Statement on Indian Water
Rights (July 14, 1982)).
273. Folk-Williams, supra note 256, at 64 n.7.
274. Pub. L. No. 101-41, 103 Stat. 83 (1989).







be in Indian reserved water negotiations now that there are specific procedures
for its participation in such negotiations.
C. Congress
Western congressional representatives and senators introduced more than
fifty bills between 1955 and 1979 to abolish or modify the federal reserved
water right.Y These efforts were unsuccessful, however, and no major
legislative proposal concerning Indian reserved water rights has been seriously
considered by Congress.28
In recognizing that resolution of the Indian reserved water rights issue
should shift from litigation to negotiated settlements, Congress has declared:
[I]t is the policy of the United States, in fulfillment of its trust
responsibility to Indian tribes, to promote Indian self-
determination and economic self-sufficiency, and to settle,
wherever possible, the water rights claims of Indian tribes without
lengthy and costly litigation; ... quantification of rights to water
and development of facilities needed to utilize tribal water
supplies effectively is essential to the development of viable
Indian reservation economies, particularly in ard western States
281
Congress, using its plenary power over the Indians, has ratified agreements
negotiated by federal and state officials with Indian tribes, Congress
usually approves negotiated settlements of local concern that have the full
support of a state's congressional delegation, but congressional scrutiny can
cause uncertainty in settlements.m
In addition to the previously mentioned water rights settlements, Congress
has enacted Water Right Claims - Ak-Chin Indian Community' (settling
all state and federal water claims of the Ak-Chin Indian Reservation in
Arizona); the Seminole Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1987'
(ending federal court litigation in Florida); the Colorado Ute Indian Water
279. Note, Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Winters of Our Discontent, 88 YALE LJ. 1689,
1703-04 (1979); see Eva Hanna Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over Western Waters - A
Decade of Attempted "Clarifying Legislation," 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 423 (1966).
280. Note, supra note 279, at 1704.
281. Fort McDowell Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-628, § 402(a)(1), (3), 104 Stat. 4480, 4480; see Water Rights Claims - Ak-Chin Indian
Community, Pub. L. No. 95-328, § 1, 92 Stat. 409, 409 (1978); Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian
Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-512, § 2, 102 Stat. 2549,
2549.
282. SLY, supra note 88, at 164-65.
283. Folk-Williams, supra note 256, at 95.
284. Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409 (1978).
285. Pub. L. No. 100-228, 101 Stat. 1556.
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Rights Settlement Act of 1988' (ending litigation in Colorado); the San
Luis Rey Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 1988' (ending litigation
in California federal court and before FERC); the Fallon Paiute Shoshone
Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act of 199e u (ending litigation in
Nevada federal court); the Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Act of 1990
(ending the Shoshone and Bannock tribes involvement in the Snake River
Basin adjudications in Idaho state court); the Fort McDowell Indian
Community Water Rights Settlement Act of 1990' (ending involvement of
a Yavapai Indian community in litigation over the Gila River System); and the
Jicarilla Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of 1992 " (ending
litigation in New Mexico state and federal courts).
The Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement Act of 1982,' which
settled the claims of the Papago Tribe with regard to the San Xavier
Reservation and the Sells Papago Reservation, exemplifies the important role
which Congress should play.' The conflict centered around the depletion
of the aquifer that the Sells Papago Indian reservation shares with the City of
Tucson, mining companies, and non-Indian irrigators.' The staff of Rep.
Morris Udall (D.-Ariz.), whose congressional district encompassed the
disputed area, performed a key role in facilitating the negotiations between
representatives of the tribe, the State of Arizona, and the City of Tucson."
Representative Udall, who chaired the House Interior and Insular Affairs
Committee at the time, obtained consent from the parties, pushed through
congressional adoption, and obtained President Reagan's signature on the
comprehensive groundwater settlement agreement in 1982,
Congress has recognized that litigation is an inefficient means of resolving
Indian water rights issues and now pursues a policy of negotiated settlements.
Congress is not usually intimately involved in the negotiations, but it has
played an important role through policy statements encouraging the settlement
process and approval of the agreements.
286. Pub. L. No. 100-585, 102 Stat. 2973.
287. Pub. L. No. 100-675, 102 Stat. 4000.
288. Pub. L. No. 101-618, 104 Stat. 3289.
289. Pub. L. No. 101-602, 104 Stat. 3059.
290. Pub. L. No. 101-628, 104 Stat. 4480.
291. Pub. L. No. 102-441, 106 Stat. 2237.
292. Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1274 (1982).
293. Folk-Williams, supra note 256, at 79-80.
294. Id.
295. Id.; see BURTON, supra note 183, at 103-07.
296. SLY, supra note 88, at 71-73. President Reagan initially vetoed the settlement because
he viewed the settlement's large financial burden on the United States government as a "federal
bailout" of a local problem. BURTON, supra note 183, at 104. Representative Udall circumvented
the veto by attaching the settlement agreement to a reclamation reform measure which the Reagan





In the states where the Winters doctrine is applicable, the Supreme Courts
rulings on quantification and the McCarran Amendment have diminished the
doctrine's importance. Quantification is simply a means of dragging Indian
water rights into prior appropriation legal systems. In states where Indian
Winters rights are in dispute, it is merely a matter of time for state
governments to quantify and appropriate Indian "reserved" water rights
through adjudication or negotiated settlement. Congress and the executive
branch have expressed a policy of favoring negotiated settlements over
protracted, costly litigation. States, for the m6st part, have also sought
negotiated agreements over litigation.
The death knell for the Winters doctrine, however, does not mean that the
doctrine was a failure.' The Winters doctrine has been successful in
preserving Indian water rights through a period of time when they could have
been forever lost. The move by states to quantify Indian water rights provides
Indian tribes with an opportunity to influence state water policies. State and
tribal cooperation in managing water systems is critical since water does not
recognize sovereign boundaries. Tribal regulation of Indian water, in areas
such as water quality and groundwater pumping, will be affected by similar
state regulation (or lack of regulation) of non-Indian water, and vice versa.
Judicial recognition of an Indian reserved right to groundwater has an
uncertain future given the results in Big Horn. While states, Indian tribes, and
the federal government are not required to negotiate, the benefits of negotiated
settlement of Indian reserved water rights exceed the costs of adjudication.
And, states and tribes electing litigation over negotiated settlement will not
risk adverse judicial decisions on unsettled issues, such as groundwater.
Another consideration is that any judicial determination could be overturned
by Congress exercising its plenary power over Indians. Current judicial
uncertainty over Indian reserved groundwater rights may prove to be
beneficial, however, in that this uncertainty may provide sufficient incentive
for both states and Indian tribes to settle Indian reserved water claims.
297. Nor does it mean that the Winters doctrine cannot be revitalized, especially in the
context of water pollution. See, e.g., William C. Galloway, Comment, Tribal Water Quality
Standards Under the Clean Water Act: Protecting Traditional Cultural Uses, 70 WASH. L. REV.
177 (1995) (discussing how the Clean Water Act allows Indian tribes to set water quality
standards). Theoretically, in riparian doctrine states Indian tribes could use the Winters doctrine
to claim a right to clean water to stop or prevent upstream pollution or groundwater
contamination, or to recover damages caused by contaminated water. To date, it does not appear
that the Winters doctrine has been asserted against water polluters by tribes in eastern and
midwestern states.
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